Positron emission tomography (PET) was used to investigate the neural correlates of feeling sympathy for someone else (i.e. the affinity, association, or relationship between persons wherein whatever affects one similarly affects the other). While undergoing PET scans, subjects were presented with a series of video-clips showing individuals (who were semi-professional stage actors) telling sad and neutral stories, as if they had personally experienced them. These stories were told with either congruent or incongruent motor expression of emotion (MEE). At the end of each movie, subjects were asked to rate the mood of the communicator and also how likable they found that person. Watching sad stories versus neutral stories was associated with increased activity in emotion processing-related structures, as well as in a set of cortical areas that belong to a "shared representation" network, including the right inferior parietal cortex. Motor expression of emotion, regardless of the narrative content of the stories, resulted in a specific regional cerebral blood flow (rCBF) increase in the left inferior frontal gyrus. The condition of mismatch between the narrative content of the stories and the motor expression of emotion elicited a significant skin conductance response and strong rCBF increase in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and superior frontal gyrus which are involved in dealing with social conflict. Taken together, these results are consistent with a model of feeling sympathy that relies on both the shared representation and the affective networks. Interestingly, this network was not activated when subjects watched inappropriate social behavior.
Introduction
Many philosophers and psychologists have proposed that prosocial behavior is often motivated by sympathy or empathy. For instance, in his Treatise of Human Nature (1739/1888), Hume [52] , observed that our minds are mirror to one another: they reflect one another's passions, sentiments, and opinions. This "sympathy" or "propensity we have to sympathize with others, to receive by communication [the] inclinations and sentiments [of others], however different from, or even contrary to, our own," he held to be the chief source of moral distinctions. For his colleague Smith [79] , sympathy is our ability to feel with other persons and it is a universal feature of human nature.
This conception of sympathy, dating from the time of the Enlightenment, is well supported today by a mass of converging evidence from developmental psychology and cognitive neuroscience. It should be noted, however, that there are many definitions of sympathy and empathy, al-most as many as there are researchers who study the topic (e.g. [9, 80] ). 1 Notably, Wispé [86] described empathy as an effortful process by which we try to comprehend another's experience, while sympathy would be a direct perceptual awareness of another person's experience akin to the phenomenon of sympathetic resonance. Yet most scholars would agree that the two concepts partly overlap and that sympathy is an affective response that frequently stems from empathy and consists of feelings of concern for the distressed or needy other person, rather than feeling the same emotion as the other person, which is closer to empathy [69] . In the present study, sympathy is taken in one of its ordinary usages, especially in French-speaking countries, i.e. the affinity, association, or relationship between persons or things wherein whatever affects one similarly affects the other. Our definition is a combination of empathy and sympathy, and reflects at a common sense level how we may in everyday life automatically interrelate with other people. Such a definition is also close to what Hodges and Wegner
